Nick Cornish
Erica Civitate
By: Victor S. Johnston
Johnston begins Chapter one by providing an example of a young man named David who proclaimed to see monsters. David was diagnosed as a schizophrenic who would ultimately spend the rest of his life hospitalized. Johnston became interested with David’s loss of reality and what it would be like to experience a completely different reality, “Plainly David had great difficulty getting along in the world in ways that you and I take for granted. For David, the lurking monsters were his reality.”
Johnston came to the conclusion that David wasn’t that different from us. Even normal people sometimes have a false outlook of the world. Johnston states, “I also began to realize that even the mentally “well” among us has a distorted picture of the physical world and that this misconception has prevented us from understanding what may be the essence of our humanity: our emotions.” Just because we perceive something using our five senses, we automatically believe it to be reality. Johnston is trying to explain that in actuality, just like David, we are hallucinating because our senses can be deceived. He uses the example of staring at a red apple and then looking at a white wall and seeing a green apple instead. This green apple would be an illusion since it is the wrong color.
People believe that by seeing a red apple mentally in their head and seeing it physically in the world would mean that they have an accurate view of reality. However, Cognivists don’t accept this commonsense viewpoint that easily. They are more interested in how we acquire, process, retain and use knowledge as a way to generate future knowledge using two basic strategies: Dry cognitive Science (DCS) and Wet Cognitive Science (WCS).
The Dry Cognitive Science (DCS) sees the brain as similar to a computer. The functions of nerve cell and computer transistors are the same. Images are converted into pattern of nerve impulses and the software programs of our visual system process that information. Then our cognitive processes, similar to computational procedures, manipulate these images. In other words the brain is like the hardware of a computer and mental processes, like thinking and seeing, are the result of programs within this hardware. David Marr and Noam Chomsky played an integral part in cognitive processes viewed as computational procedures being accepted.
Steven Pinker, who wrote How the Mind Works, states that everything in the world has symbols that, represents their attributes. We take these symbols in using our sense organs and the interaction of our mind with these unique patterns of symbols tells us about our outside world. In other words, a mental process like thinking is seen as a form of computation that can take symbols from the environment to produce external reality. From Pinker’s DCS perspective, “beliefs and desires are information, incarnated as configurations of symbols and they symbolize things in the world because they are triggered by those things via our sense organs, and because of what they do once they are triggered.” This computational theory does not account for internal conscious experience, which from a DCS perspective are merely seen as meaningless events that serve no function.
There are some variations about the details of the brain-computer analogy among Dry Cognitive scientists. Some believe that attributes, such as redness, exist only in the external world not in our heads. While others believe that redness is generated by the nervous system but has not function, somewhat like the hum that a computer produces which show that the computer is working but is not relevant to the work done by the computer programs. There are many DCS viewpoints but all basically say that the brain acts like a computer and mental processes are similar to software programs. Although the DCS approach had produced computers that can make intelligent decisions, many believe that computers will never be capable of conscious awareness and feelings.
Wet Cognitive Science is research done on real brains. Its basis is on the fact that stimulation; lesions and chemicals can alter the human mind. For example, Prozac may help someone who suffering from depression or taking LSD may produce hallucinations. Wet Cognitive Scientists believe that our perception of reality depends on our internal chemistry, not on external factors. Johnston states, “Input form the world out there is not even necessary for conscious experiences.”
Dreams support that idea that we can vivid conscious experiences even though we have no sensory input. Our senses and feelings deal with the structure and chemistry of the brain. Even though mental process may be activated by information taken in by our senses, they are not necessary. The WCS approach does not explain conscious experiences, but it shows that the brain activity generates them.
A problem arises now those attributes exist in the outside world as well as inside the brain. Externally, “redness” results from the electromagnetic radiation striking the retina. We also know that “redness” can be experienced internally without any sensory input because there is no electromagnetic radiation when we are dreaming or inside our brain, therefore our brain cells generate it. The need to eliminate one-version results in the conclusion that “redness” is evoked by electromagnetic radiation hitting the retina but it is not from the external world. Therefore, “redness” results from the arrangement and interaction of nerve cells, which is known as an emergent property.
We need to be concerned with emergent properties because it brings about what David Chalmers call the “hard problem”. The “hard problem” is if neural activity really is responsible for mental activity, “The hard problem confronts any theory of mind that considers mental events to be a product of the physical matter/energy stuff of the nervous system.” In other words, an unconscious person who still had neural organization could function normally. If nerve cells do all the work, then conscious mental states have no function.
Evolutionary functioning or consciousness is materialistic view of the world. It attempts to solve the “hard problem” by trying to find the function of emergent properties. Using an example of car race in which the course has different areas of difficulty can do this. So if new cars were manufactured based on the designs of previous winners, you would eventually end up with a care perfectly designed for that course. These aspects of design are emergent properties. Only the useful or functional properties such as “acceleration” or “cornering ability” and things such as engine size or body contour that contribute to these properties will carry on to the next design.
This car analogy can be carried over to our nerve cells in which their organization depends on how well emergent properties survive. Johnston states that, “Over the long course of evolution, the functional attributes of the mind have been responsible for shaping the physical and chemical structure of the brain.” There are some emergent properties that serve no function and thus not be passed on to future generations, so evolved attributes of the mind have to support gene survival. The human brain has also developed pleasant and unpleasant sensations and attached them to different aspects of the outside world that would hinder or promote gene survival of our ultimate design.
Johnston presents the question of is reality the external or is our perception of the external world reality? Johnson’s theory is that an experience such as the “redness” of an apple does not exist in the external world. In actuality, “the brain has evolved to generate this particular experience in the presence of a specific frequency of electromagnetic generation.” (p.14) So the apple itself is not red, but the brain interprets the apple’s specific frequency as “red”.
Johnston continues to explain that “greenness”, which are completely different experiences has an almost identical frequency. “The physical difference in wavelength between “red” and “green” is a mere 150 billionths of a meter…”(p.14) He also explained that the room we occupy is filled with infrared rays and signals for the local AM radio stations, none of which we can detect. Yet we are able to generate such experiences as color. “While some specific energy/matter configurations elicit vivid subjective experiences, others are completely ignored?”(p.14)
So if we, or any other organism, “could experience one emergent property (redness) of electromagnetic radiation and a completely different emergent property (greenness) to a frequency that is physically almost identical, then it is not only discriminating between these two signals but also exaggerating the difference between them.” (p.15) Because we enjoy the luxury of identifying between the two colors of red and green, the biological factor involved (the retinal cones) have evolved so that these distinction are more refined over the generations. The nervous system does all of the processing, but its organization is a result of natural selection favoring a particular function of that organization. This enabled experiences to grow more complex over generations.
To summarize our progression we can say that we began with naïve realism, which stated that apples appear red because they actually are red. According to the DCS theory the redness of the apple was “out there” and only symbolic representations were of importance to the nervous system. While for the WCS, the redness was brought back into the head as an emergent property. And finally, evolutionary functionalism eliminated and redness “out there” altogether, leaving it exclusively as an evolved emergent property of the nervous system.
In evaluating evolutionary functionalism Johnston explains that there are two different approaches that can provide support for the evolutionary viewpoint regarding the human mind. These two approaches are the computer simulation, and convincing evidence for adaptive historical design. As a computer, the human mind can stimulate the evolution of feelings through genetic algorithms. The second approach of examining certain emergent properties is to uncover their historical design. Emergent properties evolve because they provided solutions to problems that were consistently present and posed a threat to survival.
“The selection pressures acting over prolonged historical periods-the environments of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA’s)-were responsible for the different aspects of our satisfying design.” (p.18)
Johnston continues to explain three major problems that occur whenever attempts are made to explain nature and the origin of conscious experiences. “First it resolves the ‘double redness’ paradox by eliminating the redness in the external world, holding that all conscious experiences exist exclusively as emergent properties of neural organization. Second, it provides a functional role for these conscious experiences. They are the emergent properties of the nervous system that have been selected because they amplify and discriminate between attributes of the world that are biologically important…These discriminations play a central role in the adaptive mechanisms of learning and reasoning. Third, it explains why sensory feelings, like sweetness or saltiness, are evoked by environmental events that are clearly important for gene survival.” (p.18)
When conscious experiences are viewed as properties of biological tissue and not rigid properties of the “outside” world, then they can be continuously shaped and refined by natural selection. Natural selection cares only about the biological usefulness of an experience. Also according to Johnston, “the attributes of the mind evolve to enhance discriminations when they are functionally useful, and ignore them when unimportant.” (p.19)
In conclusion, no one is to say that our reality, or sense of norms, is better than any other is. An example is David’s chemically altered reality. This is not necessarily better, but our normal chemistry has been selected as part of the satisfying design that has permitted survival and reproduction.
It is human nature to feel a wide variety of emotions, which can be described as inner feelings that are not directly observable by other people. There is also a second category of inner feelings that act as sensory inputs. “These sensory feelings, called affects, are directly evoked by specific inputs for the internal or external environment and include such evaluative experiences as hunger and thirst or pain and sweetness, respectively.” (p.61) Affects occur in the absence of complex cognitive processes. Johnston focuses of the shared characteristics of affects and emotions.
All feelings and emotions come in hedonic tones; they are either positive or negative. “Hedonic tone refers to the evaluative aspect of a feeling, its pleasantness or unpleasantness, rather than the quality of the experienced sensation.” (p.62) Redness and blueness also contain a qualitative difference, but they do not produce a hedonic tone. One important insight for understanding the origin and function of human feelings is that they are not learned. “The feelings themselves remain constant despite considerable changes in the eliciting events.” (p.63) Learning a feeling would be analogous to an animal learning to grow hair when it gets cold. Natural selection seems to offer the only possible answer to how a person could acquire a new feeling. It is impossible to explain or understand a feeling unless it is already a part of the repertoire of feelings.
A second insight regarding in feelings is that, “their pleasantness or unpleasantness is closely related to whether the events that evoke them are, or were, likely to enhance or decrease the survival of our genes.” (p.64) The relationship between hedonic tone and gene survival is the strongest argument against the notion that conscious experiences are irrelevant. Affects and emotion will prove to be integral to our survival.
Every animal that has existed understands their environment with or without feelings. This applies to even the simplest creatures such as an amoeba or a paramecium. On page 66, Johnston states,
“The primitive ability to engulf what is useful
for biological survival (nutrient) and reject or
escape form potential danger (toxins or tissue
damage) is present in even the simplest single-cell
animals. The inherent problems involved in ap-
proaching, recognizing, and ingesting food while
avoiding toxins and other potential threats appear
to have provoked the evolution of the first eval-
uative sensory feelings.”
“Two simple hypotheses arises from these con-
siderations. The first is that sensory feelings
evolved in response to those environmental events
that have consistently presented opportunities
or threats to biological survival in ancestral
environments; and second, behaviors followed by
positive feelings are facilitated, whereas be-
haviors followed by negative feelings are inhib-
ited. These two hypotheses have been evaluated
by a computer model that was designed to stimulate
both the acquisition of affects by natural selec-
tion (an ‘outer’ genetic algorithm). If the sim-
ulation is successful, then the outer loop,
shaped by natural selection, should be capable of
evolving appropriate simulated feelings that allow
a species of computer animals to learn from their
experiences.”
The computer simulation refers to the subjects as Sniffers because the goal of the subjects were to sniff a pathway and those who could stay on the trail survived as well as their genes. However, the sniffing represented any sensory event in the environment.
“Animals designed like Sniffers will always
evolve positive affects to events that are pre-
dictive of enhanced reproductive success, and
negative affects will be evoked by events that
predict a decrease in biological survival” (Johnston,
p. 75)
This computer simulation suggests that we have evolved feelings by our ancestors being sensitive to all environmental factors that had anything to do with their reproductive success. It also showed that learning could be facilitated by selection instead of instruction. This method of learning allowed for random creative hypotheses to occur. Creativity occurred in subjects who had a wealth of knowledge while they were “in states of high emotional arousal”(Johnston, p. 78). Johnston continues to explain that it is no coincidence that famous artists have been known to have disorders related to manic-depressive disorder. “Even in ordinary people like you and me, emotions play a central role in regulating the creative processes of learning and reasoning” (Johnston, p. 78)
I. Chapter 1: The Grand Illusion
1. Example of David, a diagnosed schizophrenic
a. saw monstersà his reality
b. experiences completely different reality/loss of reality
2. Johnston makes conclusion that we aren’t that different from David
a. even mentally “well” people have a distorted perception of reality
b. just because we perceive something using our five senses it’s not always reality
1. our senses can be deceived
2. example of a red apple turning green
c. simply seeing something mentally and physically doesn’t necessarily provide an accurate view of reality
3. Cognitivists approach
a. Interested in how we acquire, process, retain and use knowledge for future knowledge.
b. Two basic strategies
1. Dry Cognitive Science
2. Wet Cognitive Science
B. Dry Cognitive Science
1. sees the brain as similar to a computer
a. images à patterns of nerve impulses
b. Software programs of our visual system process info.
c. Cognitive process (computational procedures) manipulate these images
2. Pinker (author of How the Mind Works)
a. everything made out of symbols
b. our senses take in these symbols
c. mind takes these unique pattern of symbols àtells us about outside world
d. does not account for internal conscious experiences, which in terms of DCS are meaningless events with no function (epiphenomena)
3. variations about details of the brain-computer analogy
a. attributes exist only in the external world, not in our heads
b. attributes generated by nervous system but serve no function
c. there are many variation, but all basically say that the brain acts like a computer
d. even though computer can now make intelligent decisions, never capaple of conscious awareness and feelings
C. Wet Cognitive Science
1. research done on real brains
a. stimulation, lesions and chemical can alter the human mind
b. ex. Prozac can aid someone who is depressed
2. perception of reality depends on internal chemistry, not external factors
a. dreams support idea of conscious experiences without sensory input
b. sense and feelings deal with structure and chemistry of brain
3. problem: attributes exist inside the brain and in the outside world
a. need to eliminate one (either one or the other, not both)
b. therefore, attribute evoked by the arrangement and interaction of nerve cells (emergent properties)
1. brings about “hard problem”- is neural activity really responsible for mental activity?
D. Evolutionary Functionalism
1. materialistic view of the world
2. attempts to solve the “hard problem”
a. trying to find the function of emergent properties
b. Ex. Car race and design
c. Only useful or functional properties will carry on
3. evolution is responsible for shaping the physically/chemical structure of the brain
a. evolved attributes of the mind have to support gene survival
b. brain attaches pleasant/unpleasant sensations to different aspects of the outside world to promote the ultimate design
E. Interacting with the physical world
1. Existence of redness
a. DCS Theory
b. WCS Theory
2. Evolutionary Functionalism
F. Evaluating Evolutionary Functionalism
1. Approaches that support an evolutionary viewpoint
2. Computer simulation
a. Genetic algorithms simulate feelings in a computer
3. convincing evidence for adaptive historical design.
a. Emergent properties evolve because they provide solutions
b. Environments of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA)
c. Existence of characteristics that are no longer useful but that had a clear ancestral function.
G. The adaptive Illusion
1. Three major problems that confront theories regarding origin of conscious experience.
a. “double redness” paradox
b. it provides a functional role for conscious experiences
c. it explains why sensory feelings, like sweetness or saltiness, are evoked by environmental events that are clearly important for gene survival
H. Natural Selection Criteria
1. Biological Usefulness
2. Mind evolves to enhance discrimination when they are functionally useful, and ignored them when unimportant.
I. “Satisficing Design”
1. Filter out background matter/energy
2. What is a normal reality?
a. David’s reality
b. Our reality-has permitted survival and reproduction
A. Hedonic Tones
1. Positive
2. Negative
B. Insights to understanding origin of Human Feeling
1. Not learned
2. Hedonic tone contingent on the feelings likelihood of gene survival
II. The importance of Sensory Evaluations
A. First basic sensory feelings
1. amoeba and paramecium
a. engulf nutrients
b. avoid toxins
B. Complex feelings
1. humans and animals
a. pain
b. pleasure
2. triggered by internal and external stimuli
a. stimuli present in ancestral environments
3. pleasure and pain evolved to aid in survival
a. behaviors followed by positive feelings are facilitated
b. behaviors followed by negative feelings are inhibited
III. Evolving Sensory Evaluations and Revealing Outcomes
A. Computer simulation
1. subjects were Sniffers
2. those who found pathways survived
3. natural selection took place in artificial environment
B. Outcomes
1. learning facilitatied by selection instead of instruction
2. method of learning allowed for creative hypotheses
3. creativity occurred during high emotional arousal
Critical Review
1. Identify up to three points made by the author that the panel found especially interesting or informative.
¨ Even mentally “well” people have distorted perceptions of reality. We found this partiularly interesting because it sums up Johnston’s point that everything is a grand illusion
¨ All feelings and emotions come in hedonic tones they are either positive or negative. “Hedonic tone refers to the evaluative aspect of a feeling, it’s pleasantness or unpleasantness, rather than the quality of the experienced sensation. It is truly not possible to have a feeling that is in the mid-range, if one is completely ambivalent then there is actually no feeling there at all.
¨ Creativity occurred in subjects who were intelligent and in a high state of emotional arousal. In ordinary people, emotions play a central role in creativity.
2. Identify up to three arguments made by the author that the panel either disagreed with and/or for which you think the author make a weak case. Why?
¨ We disagreed with the essence of the “hard problem”: if neural activity is responsible for mental events, then a hypothetical zombie, with no conscious experience whatsoever but with the same neural organization, would be as functional as a “normal” person. Stating that a zombie could theoretically function normally is such a bold statement, but Johnston didn’t write adequate information. Neural organization is important, but we also believe conscious awareness and feelings are necessary.
¨ Another aspect in which we disagree with Johnston is his computer simulation approach to the evolution of the human mind with respect to feelings. The computer mind was wired so that the impulses are randomized like in the human brain. The fact remains that our feelings and emotions are based upon external influences. Due to the fact that each person would respond differently to the same external influence, saying that a computer could simulate human feeling is actually eliminating feeling altogether.
¨ I understand that, in the example of David, he was hallucinating. But to say that we are all hallucinating in a way and the only difference between us and David is that his experiences are not in harmony with the physical world and that his hallucinations were not adaptive seems to be self-righteous. Why can’t David be hallucinating because his ancestors needed to in order to survive? Maybe his ancestors hallucinated to stimulate creativity.
3. Identify up to three concepts that, even after reading the material, the panel still had questions about, or that the panel would have liked the author to explain further.
¨ I (Nick) do not even think Einstein could have understood the Sniffer computer simulation. I got the concepts and outcomes but could not comprehend that multiplying an hedonic number by emotions to some power could give a value of any importance. Johnston should have inserted a math class in chapter four.
¨ We understand that attributes can be experienced internally without any sensory input because there are no electromagnetic radiation hitting our retinas when we are dreaming, but be can still experience attributes such as “redness”. However, we are confused about exactly how the brain cell generates this “redness” and if it is the same for all individuals.
¨ We thought his stand on aliens was quite confusing. He said they would be surprised that we did a strange thing called sleep. Is he saying that aliens do not sleep? He wrote that they would not understand how we could have hallucinations when we sleep without sensory stimuli. It seems to us that he is describing the aliens to be robotic, like a computer. Furthermore, he tried to show that computers can replicate feelings. Can they dream? Or are they alien?