Ed's brother, Chili, was in Company A.

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Soldiers from A Company, 254th Infantry

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The following is the story of two significant battles the 254th Infantry
was involved with during the period 20 January - 1 February 1945.
They were to be known as the Battle of Hill 216 and the Battle of
Jebsheim, France. For their part in these battles, the 2d Battalion,
254th received a Presidential Unit Citation for Jebsheim and the
regiment earned a Presidential Unit Citation and a French Croix de
Guerre with Palm for their battle successes.

HILL 216: At last, after three weeks of mastering the defensive arts,
we were assigned an offensive mission.--We were to take Hill 216.
Field Order 1, issued on 20 January 1945, indicated the plans of the
Regimental Commander for the seizure of this well defended knoll.
The First Battalion was designated assault element and assigned a
thousand yard front extending from a point south of Mittelwihr,
eastward from the easterly power line. The battalion, two companies
in a line, was to push forward to the north bank of the Weiss River
and establish defensive positions from the junction of this stream and
the power line eastward to the Fecht River and thence northward to
the highway bridge. An outpost line was to be pushed forward from
the Weiss River to a distance of some thousand yards south of the
main disposition while the bridge was to be secured by not less than
one platoon. 

During this action, the Second Battalion was to continue to hold its
defensive position facing eastward along the Fecht River. The Third
Battalion was to stand by in regimental reserve, although Company L
was assigned the mission of patrolling and outposting to the front
upon the attainment of the Weiss River line. Two days before the
attack was to be made, the First and Third Battalions were released
from their defense positions and brought to rear areas west of
Mittelwihr for training. Here we were briefed on the task which
awaited us. We found on the map that Hill 216 was located
south-west of the Alsatian town of Bennwihr, about four miles north of
Colmar. We knew that there were strongly prepared positions on the
flanks of the hill and a reinforced defensive arc running generally
parallel to the Bennwihr-Ingersheim Road. 

Although there was some tension as the time for the attack drew
nearer, a great deal of this was dissipated as we became "armchair
strategists:. Around each map a group of us would gather and a mild
discussion would begin; soon, however, fists would pound the table
as each of us realized that the rest of those present had no
understanding of what really should be done. The endangering of the
flank in our planned zone of advance by the powerfully held German
stronghold of chateau de Schoppenwihr became the major argument.
Those who believed the attack of the 7th Infantry (3rd Inf Div) in their
zone would command the attention of the defenders disputed with the
more pessimistic of us. All preferred to forget that twice before the hill
had been unsuccesfully attacked by other units. 

During the early morning hours of 23 January, the First Battalion
(Less C Company in reserve) marched from the assembly area near
Beblenheim to the line of departure. It was still snowing and a bitter
north wind seemed to tear unhampered through combat pants and
layers of sweaters ending in field jackets. Our new shoe-pacs were
warm but uncomfortable to walk in, even on the soft snow,
nevertheless we were thankful for them. As we moved along the
narrow road to the line of departure we looked like a column of
hooded ghosts in our snow capes. Company B led the column and
proceeded to the eastern half of the battalion front. A Company
followed to the western half. At fifteen minutes before "H" hour, 0700,
the 3rd Division as well as the organizational and attached artillery
began firing a preparation. We lay in the snow and watched as the
big shells flashed against the snow clad hill. As we saw the
destruction rained on whatever was out there waiting, we
remembered what the 3rd Division doughs had told us. "An
Infantryman may be the hero to a lot of people, but when you're ready
to shove off in the attack, the artilleryman is the hero's hero". Minds
and bodies became tense as we awaited the signal to move forward.
We had seen some of war but always it had been we who awaited
the enemy in our defensive positions; now it was his turn to wait in a
hole, ours to attack. For the Nth time we checked the bolt on our
rifle, or adjusted the weight of our mortar ammunition, or made sure
our K-rations were properly tied to our equipment. 
"OK, let's go!" Before we knew it we were moving forward, a lot of the
tenseness had left us, and we had begun our first combat attack.
Silently and unseen we moved through the deep snow, our capes
blending in perfectly with the world of white which surrounded us. For
a few moments after we heard the dull explosions and saw our
comrades lying on the ground, we did not realize what was
happening. No shell scream, no mortar whistle accompanied the
burst. Then our minds began to work once more and we recognized
the barrier the crafty Germans had erected--a field of the tiny,
foot-shearing Schu-mines. The heavy snow fall of the preceding days
coupled with brisk winds had perfectly hidden the mines and the
footprints of the soldiers who laid them. Together the two companies
began to cross the minefield , in the only way that a minefield can be
crossed--slowly, grimly, probing each step before moving, with a foot
or a leg or a life the penalty for a misstep. The explosions of the
mines alerted the waiting Germans and mortar fire began to pour into
the minefield. This was clearly directed from the top of the hill and
came from weapons in the woods south of the Weiss River. The
concentration was extremely heavy and B Company began to receive
large numbers of casualties from this shelling as well as from the
Schu-mines. As the light became better, machine guns opened up
from their positions along the road at the base of Hll 216 while
snipers on the northern slope of the hill aimed their deadly fire on the
men picking their way through the mine=field. 

Finally, in order to avoid a direct frontal assault on the positions at
the base of the hill, the company "gave way" to the east and started
working southward with its left flank about five hundred yards west of
the river. Fire came in increasing intensity from the Chateau de
Schoppenwihr and from the woods along the Fecht River--small arms,
machine guns, and 88's. Pinned down by this curtain of fire the
advance of the company after 0800 was tortuously slow. So heavy
was the resistance and so high the casualties that at 1000 it was
decided to employ Company C on the left flank. A Company, on the
battalion right flank, was making better progress. Although many
men fell from the Schu-mines, the mortar shells consistently dropped
behind the advancing units. As the companies neared the top of the
hill, machine gun, machine pistol, and rifle fire became devastating in
its accuracy. Courage in the face of superior fire power coupled with
heavy small arms, machine gun and mortar fire poured into the
German positions on the north slope of the hill forced the enemy to
vacate this position. By 0900 A Company had reached the crest, the
first platoon in the lead, the second in echelon to the left rear and the
third following shortly behind. When the units crossed the peak they
found enemy dug in on the south slope. Even more intense fire than
they had received from the north slope met them here as they began
again to work their way through another thickly sown minefield. Direct
fire from small arms and machine guns in the wooded area south of
the Weiss river added to the torrent of fire which the determined
Germans threw in an effort to halt the attack. Casualties mounted as
men fell from the exploding shells, the accurate small arms, and the
fiendish Schu-mines. Nevertheless, the company continued to
advance and by 1230 had reached the east-west road on the
southern face of Hill 216. Between this position and the river there
was an open field, undoubtedly mined and swept by direct fire from
the woods along the Weiss River. Considerably depleted by
casualties, the company found further advance to be impossible and
the unit commenced digging in. 

Company C, in reserve in Mittelwihr, was alerted at 1000 and by
noon, the line of departure used by the other companies earlier in the
morning was crossed. Sniper and machine gun fire from the Chateau
and the woods below it were received almost immediately, By the
time Company C had worked down to B Company's former position,
the latter unit had pushed forward. A group of riflemen had inched
toward the machine gun nests and silenced the guns and B
Company was moving forward again. As they came to the east-west
road, the second platoon spread to the right to gain contact with A
Company, while a small group from the first platoon, following theEdge of a vineyard pushed toward the Weiss River. Contact was
made with A Company by B Company's second platoon at 1430. The
other platoon pulled to the west of the north-south road and using an
abandoned enemy CP formed a defensive line facing east. the
leading element of C Company had not proceeded far along this road
before it met B Company's group returning from the river, still under
small arms fire. C Company, therefore, built up a defensive line east
of the road facing the Fecht River. At about 1400 it became apparent
that the now depleted First Battalion without assistance would be
unable to reach the Weiss river before dark. the Third Battalion was
alerted and moved out at 1650. Only two rifle companies were
available to that unit for the operation. Company I remaining in
regimental reserve. In addition, K was short one platoon which had
been employed since early morning on the First Battalion's left flank
and was still pinned down by fire from the Chateau. Leaving the
assembly area near Beblenheim, I and K Company proceeded along
the east side of the Bennwihr-Ingersheim road between the two power
lines. The advance of both units was slowed down considerably by a
mine field encountered on the approach march. Probing their way
through this under continued small arms and machine gun fire, I
Company proceeded, under intense fire from the south bank of the
Weiss River, to the junction of the eastern power line and the stream.
Here, after extending eastward, the men dug in at about 1900. 

Company had cleared from in front of A, K Company moved out
eastward along the road. On turning south the company came under
heavy machine gun and mortar fire from below the chateau.
Cautiously the unit crossed the minefield as the scream of shrapnel
coupled with the sharp crack of well aimed bullets made the men
want to leave the single path being probed through the mine studded
area. With the aid of well place mortar fire, K reached the Weiss
River, at its junction with the Fecht. Upon arriving at this point about
2100, the company deployed west along the bank toward I Company.
As K began to dig in, the lack of the detached platoon was strongly
felt. At midnight a group from B Company was inserted between the
two Third Battalion companies. 

The night following our first attack came and suddenly all the death
we had seen, the noise we had heard, the fear we had felt descended
on us like an avalanche, leaving us only cold ,wet and exhausted.
Our first day of attack was over. Even through our tiredness we
realized that each of us was a wiser man than he had been the day
before. We knew that battle was not glorious; we knew that our
minds had been left with an imprint that even time could not fully
erase; we knew that we had been through something that none of us
would ever be able to adequately describe. 

    ----------------------------

t had become apparent as the month of January drew to a close that
the hub of resistance, the key, to the entire Colmar Pocket was the
well fortified town of Jebsheim, France. The village itself is laid out in
a way highly advantageous to the defender. The principal artery of the
town is a north-south street with stone buildings on either side.
Branching off at both ends of the main street are two parallel ones
leading west. Weapons located in the houses along these streets
can effectively cover with cross-fire almost all the area to the west of
the town. The Germans had skillfully supplemented Jebsheim's
natural defensive virtues. Along the street and road leading northwest,
heavy concrete bunkers had been built. In an arc, extending above
the northwest street, a row of pillboxes defended to the north, while
other steel reinforced emplacements at the southern end completed
the strong defensive system. 

On the night of 23 January, while the attack on Hill 216 was still in
progress, the tanks and tank destroyers attached to the regiment
had been released. Now, they were attached once more. Operation
Instruction Number 8 specified that elements of the Reconnaissance
Company and a platoon of C Company, 601st Tank Destroyer
Battalion were to maintain contact with the lst DMI, follow the
Second Battalion, and stand ready to reduce such strong points as
might be encountered. A light tank platoon of C Company 756th Tank
Battalion, was to follow the tank destroyers, protecting the rear and
assisting the battalions by fire. A chemical mortar platoon and a
AAA/AW platoon remained attached as before. So swiftly had come
the decision for the regiment to attack Jebsheim, that when the
regimental staff and battalion commanders returned from Third
Division Headquarters, it was already the hour set to launch the
attack, 1600. There was time for only the barest briefing possible to
the company commanders. As we moved out of the Colmar Forest,
most of us knew only that the First and Second Battalions were to be
employed initally with the First Battalion on the right maintaining
contact with the 15th Infantry (3rd Div) driving south below Riedwihr
with the Second Battalion on the left linked itself with the 1st DMI by
reconnaissance elements. The third Battalion had been designated
as regimental reserve, to be used on Third Division order only. 

At 1600 the two battalions moved out, each maintaining a two
company front--the First on the right side of the northwest road, the
Second on the left side. We had supposed that the operations of the
15th Infantry insured us an easy approach to the line of departure.
This proved untrue. Shortly after crossing the Ill River, more than
fifteen hundred yards short of the line of departure, we received fire
from machine guns and small arms in the northern end of the Bois de
Jebsheim as well as heavy artillery fire from the vicinity of Jebsheim.
Sub-zero temperature combined with a fierce north wind which
whipped the deep snow into a frenzy of blinding ice partricles slowed
our advance to a painful crawl as we fought our way through artillery
and rocket barrages to the line of depature. This was reached at
about 2100, and already the effect of the cold and exertion began to
show on us; the First Battalion especially suffered, their complete
lack of sleep and rest for so many hours made their resistance very
low. 

Because of the difficulty which the Blind River presented, our
formation was changed at the line of departure to a column of
companies, in each battalion. Upon traversing the road west of the
Blind River, the advance became even more difficult under the
machine gun, rifle, and pistol fire. We found that a detachment of
French troops had taken the burning buildings of Jebsheim Mills.
Even though we realized the danger of falling debris, shells directed
on the Mills, and the perfect outline our bodies made against the
bright flames, many of us were more than willing to take the chance
as we huddled for a few minutes as close to the fire as possibe. This
was reportedly one of the coldest nights of the entire winter; warmth
seemed more important than safety. At about 2230 G Company,
leading the Second Battalion, crossed the Blind River. With two
platoons abreast, one either side of the road, the unit moved toward
the town. After advancing a few hundred yards, the company lost
contact with the First Battalion on the right and stopped. 

The First Battalion meanwhile was running into difficult obstacles. A
Company, leading, waded across the icy, swift-flowing river.
Emerging on the west bank, the company was pinned down by
accurate heavy machine gun fire. Contact was lost as the men of A,
soaked from the waist down, crawled through the deep snow. B
Company inched its way from behind and finally contacted G. Both
companies then moved along the northwestern approach to the town.
After another hour of slow advance the two companies came within
400 yards of the outlying bunkers. Here they were competely pinned
down as fire rained on them from three directions; the Bois de
Jebsheim to the south, the vicinity of Grussenheim to the north, and
the bunkers of Jebsheim to the east. Mortar fire was placed on the
bunkers, but was ineffective; a patrol sent southwestward to silence
the machine guns in the Bois de Jebsheim met with failure as frozen
weapons failed to work for their frozen owners. So intense was the
small arms and artillery fire brought to bear on us that even after a
fifteen minute barrage by four battalions of field artillery, the
resistance was still so heavy that we could advance not further. At
0430 the two leading companies began a withdrawal toward the Blind
river. The Second Battalion formed a defensive arc around the eastern
side of Jebsheim Mills while the First Battalion took positions in a
ditch several yards west of the north-south road. 
Undoubtedly, this night was the most miserable the regiment ever
experienced. Each man had carried only one blanket into the attack,
and most of these had been soaked when we crossed the Blind. All
of our clothing was wet either from the stream or from the snow
melted by our body heat as we lay in it. The clothing had now frozen
to our skin. No fires could be lit. Those of us not on guard slept.
Somehow, the night finally ended. The following morning we counted
our casualties, and met a new enemy, one who accounted for five
times as many men as the Germans- the dreaded trenchfoot. Men
who could hardly walk hobbled back to aid stations to be evacuated
to hospitals. The First Battalion suddenly fell to less than company
strength. the Second Battalion, which had not been committed on
Hill 216, fared much better, although it too, had a share of frozen
hands and trenchfoot. Meanwhile, plans were being made to attack
Jebsheim again that evening. The volume of fire which had come from
the Bois de Jebsheim indicated that the clearing of this forest would
require considerable attention. Therefore, while the First and Second
Battalions continued their attack on Jebsheim, the Third Battalion
would pass through Reidwihr and reduce the enemy holding in the
Bois de Jebsheim. this done, the third Battalion was to advance
eastward and assist in the taking of Jebsheim by and attack from the
South. 

It was just getting dark on the evening of 26 January when
the Third Battalion moved out of Riedwihr. I Company was in
the lead as the troops crossed the little stream just east of
Riedwihr. this unit's mission was to clear the patch of woods
just north of the Riedwihr-Jebsheim road. L company was to
turn off the road to the south and clear the upper half of the
forest which lay on that side; K Company was to keep to the
right of L and sweep the southern half of the woods. I company
sent its three rifle platoons forward at 1700, two platoons
abreast, one to the rear. The two leading platoons came under
mortar and small arms fire, but were able to reach the easternEdge of the woods. The reserve element was fired on and
pinned down by a well emplaced machine gun at the stream
junction to the north. Two squads sent to silence the gun were
unable to close in on the weapon, but is was finally eliminated
by mortar fire. Defensive positions were then placed along the
eastEdge of the woods and the company remained here that
night. The attack by L Company began at 2100. Meeting little
resistance, the company turned south off the road, then pushed
eastward, intending to advance to the eastEdge of the forest.
However, a large clearing in the center of the woods was
mistaken, in the darkness, for the fields beyond. When the
company arrived at this clearing it went into defensive
positions. K Company had jumped off and pushed due south
through the western portion of the forest. The advance was
succesful until the company was within a short distance of the
clearing. At this point K Company encoutered heavy fire from
the southernEdge of the woods, mostly consisting of high
velocity, flat trajectory fire. Unable to proceed the company
fell back to Riedwihr, leaving one platoon in defense postions
at the point of farthest advance. 

Meanwhile, the attack on Jebsheim had started at about the
same time that the Third Battalion moved out. The objective
remained the same--the northern half of the town to the
Second Battalion and the southern half of the town to the First
Battalion. F Company passed through and led G Company,
which was to protect the left flank. E company remained as
battalion reserve in the defensive positions occupied the night
before by one of its platoons. C Company, with A Company
following, launched the First Battalion's attack. B Company,
initally to rear of the other companies was to stand by until
they had cleared, then strike the southern part of the town.
Companies C and F waded through the deep snow toward the
bunkers which had turned them back the previous night.
Moving along the northwest road toward the junction at the
western approach to the town, the battalions again met a
furious hail of fire about five hunbdred yards from the
defending emplacements. This was of the same pattern as that
received the night before--88mm fire from three directions,
automatic weapons from the bunkers, and small arms from
dug in positions around the pillboxes. Slowly they moved
forward, inching their way through the snow and attempted to
reduce the fortifications with well-aimed bazooka fire. This
proved successful with all but one of the bunkers, whose two
foot thick walls merely ricocheted the rockets into the air. As a
last resort, the tank destoyers were brought up, braving the
dangerous 88's east of the town, and fired point blank through
the thick walls of the bunker and rendered possible its capture
by F Company men. 

At this point A Company and C Company, greatly
understrength from the battles of the last four days, joined with
F Company for the final push into town. At 2400 we saw one of
the most awe-inspiring scenes most of us can recall, as eight
battalions of artillery laid a concentration into Jebsheim which
lasted for fifteen minutes. As we watched it seemed as if the
village, laying peacefully asleep one moment, became
nothing but a massive sheet of flame the next. By 0100 27
January, F Company and the remnants of the First Battalion
were on the northwest street of the town. Three hours later
Jebsheim was clear to the upper square. In this engagement,
which was extremely bitter while it lasted, G company worked
parallel to F Company along the northwest street. The now
exhausted men of F Company organized defensive positions in
houses while G Company set up an arc facing north toward
Grussenheim. Since little activity was observed in the southern
part of the town, we believed that Jebsheim was clear except
for snipers. G Company that afternoon, therefor, began the task
of clearing the north-south street. the unit soon discovered that
our surmise had been far from right. After in intense battle
which lasted all that day, G company finally fought its way
down to the lower square. The fighting was of the most severe
type possible- house to house, floor to floor, room to room.
Before the company had time to prepare proper defense at the
lower square, a strong counterattack developed from the
enemy position, and the depleted unit was driven back
through sheer weight of numbers and fire power. The
counterattack was finally repulsed at the upper square. 

The following morning, 28 January, the French desired to pass
through the town, but failed in their attempt to break the
German lines. E Company then resumed the attack at 1400 to
reduce resistance in the southern end of Jebsheim. Gaining
impetus as the drive progressed smoothly and swiftly, the
company was across the intesection and about five houses
down on the left side of the street an hour later. 115 prisoners
had been taken at the cost of 26 killed or wounded. At about
1700 the enemy launched another desperate counterattack,
and as the company was slowly forced to give ground, G
company was commited to aid them. Together the two units
repulsed that attack and made plans to continue the advance
at 0400 on the 29th of January. Just before the companies
began their attack, three Germans entered our lines and asked
E Company to surrender, saying "We know you have only a
company here and we have a battalion." The men of E
company opened fire in answer and began the last most bitter
fight for the possession of Jebsheim. 

The enemy was being supplied and reinforced by the road
leading north into Jebsheim from Muntzenheim. To cut this
road and to provide a base of fire for I Company striking
Jebsheim from the south, the Third Battalion left its position in
the Bois de Jebsheim at 1130 that day. Leaving K Company in
reserve, I and L Company moved out along the road. Arriving
at the bridge over the small creek, Company L turned south
along the west bank to provide a base of fire for I Company,
which was to move southeast, by-passing the tip of Jebsheim
and turning sharply north strike the enemy in the vineyards just
east of the German-occupied houses. Heavy fire from these
houses caused a change in I Company's operation; a flank
attack was decided upon. Accordingly the unit moved in by the
road leading west from the southern end of the town. A French
tank encountered on the outskirts was persuaded to assist
them and the newly formed tank-infantry team attacked enemy
strongpoints on the west side of the north-south street. At the
time of the Third Battalion's arrival, the fight between the
Second Battalion and the enemy in his remaining houses was
particularly violent. Compressing the Germans into these few
houses below the southern square had necessitated the
commitment of the remaining elements of the First Battalion as
well as the reserve company of the Second Battalion. From the
houses, from the bunkers, and from the foxholes in the
vine-yards southeast of the steet crossing, the enemy resisted
fiercely with automatic weapons while 88mm guns poured fire
on the attackers. The impact of I Company coupled with the
blows being delivered by the Second Battalion, broke the
German's desire to resist further. At about 1630, they began to
march out of their foxholes, first in small groups of five and
ten, then in large groups to surrender. The total was about 450,
most of whom were members of the 136th Mountain Regiment.

Jebsheim, itself, was now taken. The cost had been high, with
the regiment losing sixty-six killed in action. But we felt that
the cost was worth the price we had paid for it. According to
statements of prisoners of war, the town had been used as a
corps headquarters. It was not until later that we learned that
the Third Division had not expected us to be able to capture
this stronghold. the question as to why our determination was
so strong, our fighting so fierce in taking this town was
probably best answered by one PFC. who said, "If you think I
was going to stay out in some damn foxhole full of snow while
the Krauts were living in nice warm cellars, you're crazy!"